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The increasing development of peer-to-peer networks for delivering and sharing multimedia files poses the problem of how to
protect these contents from unauthorized manipulations. In the past few years, a large amount of techniques have been proposed
to identify whether a multimedia content has been illegally tampered or not. Nevertheless, very few eﬀorts have been devoted to
identifying which kind of attack has been carried out, especially due to the large data required for this task. We propose a novel
hashing scheme which exploits the paradigms of compressive sensing and distributed source coding to generate a compact hash
signature, and apply it to the case of audio content protection. The audio content provider produces a small hash signature by
computing a limited number of random projections of a perceptual, time-frequency representation of the original audio stream;
the audio hash is given by the syndrome bits of an LDPC code applied to the projections. At the content user side, the hash
is decoded using distributed source coding tools. If the tampering is sparsifiable or compressible in some orthonormal basis or
redundant dictionary, it is possible to identify the time-frequency position of the attack, with a hash size as small as 200 bits/second;
the bit saving obtained by introducing distributed source coding ranges between 20% to 70%.
Copyright © 2009 G. Valenzise et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. Introduction
With the increasing diﬀusion of digital multimedia contents
in the last years, the possibility of tampering with multimedia
contents—an ability traditionally reserved, in the case of
analog signals, to few people due to the prohibitive cost of
the professional equipment—has become quite a widespread
practice. In addition to the ease of such manipulations, the
problem of the diﬀusion of unauthorized copies of multi-
media contents is exacerbated by security vulnerabilities and
peer-to-peer sharing over the Internet, where digital contents
are typically distributed and posted. This is particularly true
for the case of audio files, which represent the most common
example of digitally distributed multimedia contents. Some
versions of the same audio piece may diﬀer from the original
because of processing, due for example to compression,
resampling, or transcoding at intermediate nodes. In other
cases, however, malicious attacks may occur by tampering
with part of the audio stream and possibly aﬀecting its
semantic content. Examples of this second kind of attacks
are the alteration of a piece of evidence in a criminal trial, or
the manipulation of public opinion through the use of false
wiretapping. Often, for the sake of information integrity, not
only it is useful to detect whether the audio content has been
modified or not, but also to identify which kind of attack has
been carried out. The reasons why it is generally preferred
to identify how the content has been tampered with are
twofold: on one hand, given an estimate of where the signal
was manipulated, one can establish whether or not the audio
file is still meaningful for the final user; on the other hand, in
some circumstances, it may be possible to recover the original
semantics of the audio file.
In the past literature, the aim of distinguishing legiti-
mately modified copies from manipulations of a multimedia
file has been addressed with two kinds of approaches:
watermarks and media hashes. Both approaches have been
extensively applied to the case of image content types, while
fewer systems have been proposed for the case of audio
signals. Digital watermarking techniques embed information
directly into the media data to ensure both data integrity and
authentication. Even if digital watermarks can be categorized
based on several properties, such as robustness, security,
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complexity, and invertibility [1], a common taxonomy is to
distinguish between robust and fragile watermarks. It is the
latter category that is particularly useful for checking the
integrity of an audio file; a fragile watermark is a mark that
is easily altered or destroyed when the host data is modified
through some transformation, either legitimate or not. If the
watermark is designed to be robust with respect to legitimate,
perceptually irrelevant modifications (e.g., compression or
resampling), and at the same time to be fragile with respect to
perceptually and semantic significant alterations, then it is a
content-fragile watermark [1]. With this scheme, a possible
tampering can be detected and localized by identifying
the damage to the extracted watermark. Examples of this
approach for the case of image content types are given in
[2, 3]. The authors of [4] propose an image authentication
scheme that is able to localize tampering, by embedding
a watermark in the wavelet coeﬃcients of an image. If
a tampering occurs, the system provides information on
specific frequencies and space regions of the image that have
been modified. This allows the user to make application-
dependent decisions concerning whether an image, which is
JPEG compressed for instance, still has credibility. A similar
idea, also working on the signal wavelet domain, has been
applied to audio in [5], with the aim of copyright verification
and tampering identification. The image watermarking
system devised in [6] inserts a fragile watermark in the
least significant bits of the image on a block-based fashion;
when a portion of the image is tampered with, only the
watermark in the corresponding blocks is destroyed, and the
manipulation can be localized. Celik et al. [7] extend this
method by inserting the watermark in a hierarchical way, to
improve robustness against vector quantization attacks. In
[8], image protection and tampering localization is achieved
through a technique called “cocktail watermarking”; two
complementary watermarks are embedded in the original
image to improve the robustness of the detector response,
while at the same time enabling tampering localization.
The same ideas have been applied by the authors to the
case of sounds [9], by inserting the watermark in the
host audio FFT coeﬃcients. For a more exhaustive review
of audio watermarking for authentication and tampering
identification see Steinebach and Dittmann [1].
Despite their widespread diﬀusion as a tool for mul-
timedia protection, watermarking schemes suﬀer from a
series of disadvantages: (1) watermarking authentication is
not backward compatible with previously encoded contents
(unmarked contents cannot be authenticated later by just
retrieving the corresponding hash); (2) the original content
is distorted by the watermark; (3) the bit rate required
to compress a multimedia content might increase due
to the embedded watermark. An alternative solution for
authentication and tampering identification is the use of
multimedia hashes. Unlike watermarks, content hashing
embeds a signature of the original content as part of the
header information, or can provide a hash separately from
the content upon a user’s request. Multimedia hashes are
inspired by cryptographic digital signatures, but instead
of being sensitive to single-bit changes, they are supposed
to oﬀer proof of perceptual integrity. Despite some audio
hashing systems (also named audio fingerprinting) being
proposed in the past few years [10–12], most of the previous
research, as for the case of watermarking, has concentrated
on the case of images [13, 14]. In [10], the authors build
audio fingerprints by collecting and quantizing a number
of robust and informative features from an audio file,
with the purpose of audio identification as well as fast
database lookup. Haitsma and Kalker [11] build audio
fingerprints robust to legitimate content modifications (mp3
compression, resampling, moderate time, and pitch scaling),
by dividing the audio signal in highly overlapping frames
of about 0.3 seconds; for each frame, they compute a
frequency representation of the signal through a filter bank
with logarithmic spacing among the bands, in order to
resemble the human auditory system (HAS). The redun-
dance of musical sounds is exploited by taking the diﬀerences
between subbands in the same frame, and between the same
subbands in adjacent time instants; the resulting vector is
quantized with one bit, and similarities between each short
fingerprint are computed through the Hamming distance.
By concatenating all the fingerprints of each frame, a global
hash is obtained, which is used next to eﬃciently query a
song database of previously encoded fingerprints. Though
in principle such an approach could be used for identifying
possible localized tampering in the audio stream, the authors
do not explicitly address this problem. An excellent review
of algorithms and applications of audio fingerprinting is
presented in [12].
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no audio hashing
technique has been used up to now with the purpose of
detecting and localizing unauthorized audio tampering. One
of the main reasons of that is probably the great amount
of bits of the audio hashes required for enabling the iden-
tification of the tampering, when traditional fingerprinting
approaches as the ones described above are employed. In
fact, in order to limit the rate overhead, the size of the hash
needs to be as small as possible. At the same time, the goal
of tampering localization calls for increasing the hash size,
in order to capture as much as possible about the original
multimedia object. Recently, Lin et al. have proposed a new
hashing technique for authentication [14] and tampering
localization [15] for images, which produce very short
hashes by leveraging distributed source coding theory. In this
system, the hash is composed of the Slepian-Wolf encoding
bitstream of a number of quantized random projections of
the original image; the content user (CU) computes its own
random projections on the received (and possibly tampered)
image, and uses them as a side information to decode
the received hash. By setting some maximum predefined
tampering level on the received image (e.g., a minimum
tolerated PSNR between the original and the forged image
is allowed), it is possible to transmit the hash without the
need of a feedback channel, performing rate allocation at
the encoder side (a similar bit allocation technique has been
adopted by the authors also in the context of reduced-
reference image quality assessment [16]). When decoding
succeeds, it is possible to identify tampered regions of the
image, at the cost of additional hash bits. This scheme has
been applied also to the case of audio files [17]; instead
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of random projections of pixels, the authors compute for
each signal frame a weighted spectral flatness measure, with
randomly chosen weights, and encode this information to
obtain the hash. Though this scheme applies well to the
authentication task (which can be attained with a hash
overhead less than 100 bits/second), it is not clear how to
extend the application to identification of general kinds of
tampering.
We have recently proposed a new image hashing tech-
nique [18] which exploits both the distributed source coding
paradigm and the recent developments in the theory of
compressive sensing. The algorithm proposed in this paper
extends these ideas to the scenario of audio tampering. It
also shares some similarities with the works in [15, 17];
as in [17], the hash is generated by computing random
projections starting from a perceptually significant time-
frequency representation of the audio signal and storing the
syndrome bits obtained by Low-Density Parity-Check Codes
(LDPC) encoding the quantized coeﬃcients. With respect to
[17], the proposed algorithm is novel in the following aspect:
by leveraging compressive sensing principles, we are able to
identify tamperings that are not sparse in the time domain
only, but that can be represented by a sparse set of coeﬃcients
in some orthonormal basis or redundant dictionary. Even if
the spatial models introduced in [15] could be thought of
as a representation of the tampering in some dictionary, it is
apparent that the compressive sensing interpretation allows
much more flexibility in the choice of the sparsifying basis,
since it just uses oﬀ-the-shelf basis expansions (e.g., wavelet
or DCT) which can be added to the system for free.
To clear up which are the capabilities and the limitations
of the proposed system, Figure 1 shows an example of mali-
cious tampering with an audio signal. This demonstration
has been carried out on a piece of audio speech, with a
length of approximately 2 seconds, read from a newspaper
by a speaker. The whole recording, which is about 32 seconds
long, has also been used as a proof of concept to present some
experimental results on the system in Section 7. Figure 1(a)
shows the original waveform, which corresponds to the
Italian sentence “un sequestro da tredici milioni di euro”
(a confiscation of thirteen million euros). This sentence
has been tampered with in order to substitute the words
“tredici milioni” (thirteen million) with “quindici miliardi”
(fifteen billion), see Figure 1(b). In order to compute the
hash, as explained in Section 4, we compute a coarse-scale
perceptual time-frequency map of the signal (in this case,
with a temporal resolution of 1/4 seconds). From the received
tampered waveform and from the information of the hash,
the user is able to identify the tampering (Figure 1(d)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
provides the necessary background information about com-
pressive sensing and distributed source coding; Section 3
describes the tampering model; Section 4 gives a detailed
description of the system; Section 6 describes how it is
possible to estimate the rate of the hash at the encoder
without feedback channel or training; the tampering iden-
tification algorithm is tested against various kinds of attacks
in Section 7, where also the diﬀerent bit-rate requirements
for the hash with or without distributed source coding
are compared; finally, Section 8 draws some concluding
remarks.
2. Background
In this section, we review the important concepts behind
compressive sensing and distributed source coding, that
constitute the underlying theory of the proposed tampering
identification system. In spite of the relatively large amount
of literature published on these fields in the past few years,
this is a very concise introduction; for a more detailed
and exhaustive explanation the interested reader may refer
to [19–21] for compressive sensing and to [22–24] for
distributed source coding.
2.1. Compressive Sampling (CS). Compressive sampling (or
compressed sensing) is a new paradigm which asserts that
it is possible to perfectly recover a signal from a limited
number of incoherent, nonadaptive linear measurements,
provided that the signal admits a sparse representation in
some orthonormal basis or redundant dictionary, that is, it
can be represented by a small number of nonzero coeﬃcients
in some basis expansion. Let x ∈ Rn be the signal to be
acquired, and y ∈ Rm, m < n, a number of linear random
projections (measurements) obtained as y = Ax. In general,
given the prior knowledge that x is k-sparse, that is, that only
k out of its n coeﬃcients are diﬀerent from zero, one can
recover x by solving the following optimization problem:
min‖x‖0 s.t. y = Ax, (1)
where ‖·‖0 simply counts the number of nonzero elements
of x. This program can correctly recover a k-sparse signal
from m = k + 1 random samples [25]. Unfortunately, such a
problem is NP hard, and it is also diﬃcult to solve in practice
for problems of moderate size.
To overcome this exhaustive search, the compressive
sampling paradigm uses special measurement matrices A
that satisfy the so-called restricted isometry property (RIP) of
order k [21], which says that all subsets of k columns taken
from A are in fact nearly orthogonal or, equivalently, that
linear measurements taken with A approximatively preserve
the Euclidean length of k-sparse signals. This in turn implies
that k-sparse vectors cannot be in the null space of A, a
fact that is extremely useful, as otherwise there would be
no hope of reconstructing these vectors. Merely verifying
that a given A has the RIP according to the definition is
combinatorially complex; however, there are well-known
cases of matrices that satisfy the RIP, obtained for instance
by sampling i.i.d. entries from the normal distribution with
mean 0 and variance 1/n. When the RIP holds, then the
following linear program gives an accurate reconstruction
min‖x‖1 s.t. y = Ax. (2)
The solution of (2) is the same as the one of (1) provided
that the number of measurements satisfy m ≥ C·k log2(n/k),
where C is some small positive constant. Moreover, if x is
not exactly sparse, but it is at least compressible (i.e., its coef-
ficients decay as a power law), then solving (2) guarantees
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(d) The tampering in the perceptual time-frequency domain as
estimated by the proposed algorithm
Figure 1: An example of the result of the proposed audio tampering identification, applied to a fragment of speech read from a newspaper.
that the quality of the recovered signal is as good as if one
knew ahead of time the location of the k largest values of x
and decided to measure those directly [21]. These results also
hold when the signal is not sparse as is, but it has a sparse
representation in some orthonormal basis. Let Ψ ∈ Rn×n
denote an orthonormal matrix, whose columns are the basis
vectors. Let us assume that we can write x = Ψα, where α is
a k-sparse vector. Clearly, (2) is a special case of this instance,
when Ψ is the identity matrix. Given the measurements y =
Ax, the signal x can be reconstructed by solving the following
problem:
min‖α‖1 s.t. y = AΨα. (3)
Problem (3) can be solved without prior knowledge of the
actual sparsifying basis Ψ for diﬀerent test bases, until a
sparse reconstruction α is obtained.
In most practical applications, measurements are aﬀected
by noise (e.g., quantization noise). Let us consider noisy
measurements y = Ax + z, where z is a norm-bounded noise,
that is, ‖z‖2 ≤ . An approximation of the original signal x
can be obtained by solving the modified problem:
min‖α‖1 s.t. ‖y − AΨα‖2 ≤ . (4)
Problem (4) is an instance of a second-order cone program
(SOCP) [26] and can be solved in O(n3) time. Several fast
algorithms have been proposed in the literature that attempt
to find a solution to (4). In this work, we adopt the SPGL1
algorithm [27], which is specifically designed for large-scale
sparse reconstruction problems.
2.2. Distributed Source Coding (DSC). Consider the problem
of communicating a continuous random variable X . Let Y
denote another continuous random variable correlated to
X . In a distributed source coding setting, the problem is to
decodeX to its quantized reconstruction ̂X given a constraint
on the distortion measure D = E[d(X , ̂X)] when the side
information Y is available only at the decoder. Let us denote
by RX|Y (D) the rate-distortion function for the case when
Y is also available at the encoder, and by RWZX|Y (D) the case
when only the decoder has access to Y . The Wyner-Ziv
theorem [23] states that, in general, RWZX|Y (D) ≥ RX|Y (D) but
RWZX|Y (D) = RX|Y (D) for Gaussian memoryless sources and
mean square error (MSE) as distortion measure.
The Wyner-Ziv theorem has been applied especially in
the area of video coding under the name of distributed video
coding (DVC), where the source X (pixel values or DCT
coeﬃcients) is quantized with 2J levels, and the J bitplanes
are independently encoded, computing parity bits by means
of a turbo encoder. At the decoder, parity bits are used
together with the side information Y to “correct” Y into
a quantized version ̂X of X , performing turbo decoding,
typically starting from the most significant bitplanes. To this
EURASIP Journal on Image and Video Processing 5
end, the decoder needs to know the joint probability density
function (pdf) pXY (X ,Y). More recently, LDPC codes have
been adopted instead of turbo codes [28, 29].
Although the rate-distortion performance of a practical
DSC codec strongly depends on the actual implementation
employed, it is yet possible to approximately quantify the
gain obtained by introducing a Wyner-Ziv coding paradigm,
in order to estimate the bit saving produced in the hash
signature. Let X and Y be zero mean, i.i.d. Gaussian variables
with variance, respectively, σ2X and σ
2
Y ; also, let σ
2
N be the
variance of the innovation noise N = Y − X . Classical
information theory [30] asserts that the rate expressed in bits
per sample for a given distortion level D, in the case of a
Gaussian source X is given by




The rate-distortion function for the case of Wyner-Ziv















which becomes, in the hypothesis that σ2X  σ2N , approxi-









Subtracting (7) from (5), we obtain the expected coding gain
due to Wyner-Ziv coding




As we will see in Section 4, σ2X relates to the energy of the
original signal, while σ2N to the energy of the tampering.
Equation (8) shows that the advantage of using a DSC
approach with respect to a traditional quantization and
encoding becomes consistent when the signal and the side
information are well correlated, that is, when the energy of
the tampering is small relative to the energy of the original
sound.
3. Tampering Model
Before describing in more detail the architecture of the
system, we need to set up a model for sparse tampering. Let
x ∈ Rn be the original signal; we model the eﬀect of a sparse
tampering e ∈ Rn as
x˜ = x + e, (9)
where x˜ is the modified signal received by the user. We
postulate without loss of generality that e has only k
nonzero components (in fact, it suﬃces for e to be sparse or
compressible in some basis or frame).
Let y = Ax be the random measurements of the original
signal and y˜ = Ax˜ be the projections of the tampered
signal; clearly, the relation between the tampering and the
measurements is given by
b = y˜ − y = A(x˜ − x) = Ae. (10)
If the sensing matrix A is chosen such that it satisfies the RIP,
we have that





and thus we are able to approximate the energy of the
tampering from the projections computed at the decoder
and the encoder-side projections reconstructed exploiting
the hash. This fact comes out to be very useful to estimate the
energy of the tampering at the CU side and will be exploited
in Section 4. Furthermore in order to apply the Wyner-Ziv
theorem, we need b to be i.i.d. Gaussian with zero mean. This
has been verified through experimental simulations on sev-
eral tampering examples. Indeed, a theoretical justification
can be provided by invoking the central limit theorem, since
each element bi =
∑n
j=1 Aije j is the sum of random variables
whose statistics are not explicitly modeled.
4. Description of the System
The proposed tampering detection and localization scheme
is depicted in Figure 2. The general architecture of the system
is composed by two actors: on one hand, there is the
content producer (CP), which is the entity that publishes or
distributes the legitimate and authentic copies of the original
audio content. On the other hand, there is the CU, which is
the consumer of the audio content released by the CP. The CP
disseminates copies of the original content X ∈ RN , where N
is the total number of audio samples of the signal, through
possibly untrusted intermediaries, which may tamper with
the authentic file manipulating its semantics; at the same
time, the CU may get its own copy ˜X of the audio file from
nodes diﬀerent from the starting CP. In order to protect
the integrity of the multimedia content, the CP builds a
small hash signature H of the audio signal. To perform
content authentication, the user sends a request for the hash
signature to an authentication server, which is supposed to
be trustworthy. By exploiting the hash, the user can estimate
the distortion of the received content ˜X with respect to the
original X. Furthermore, if the tampering is sparse in some
basis expansion, the system produces a tampering estimation
ê which identifies the attack in the time-frequency domain.
In the following, we detail the hash generation procedure at
the CP side and the tampering identification at the CU side.
4.1. Generation of the Hash Signature. At the CP side, given
the audio stream X and a random seed S, the encoder
generates the hash signature H(X, S) as follows.
(1) Frame-Based Subband Log-Energy Extraction. The orig-
inal single-channel audio stream X is partitioned into
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Figure 2: Block diagram of the proposed tampering identification scheme.
nonoverlapping frames of length F samples. The power
spectrum of each frame is subdivided into U Mel frequency
subbands [31], and for each subband the related spectral
log-energy is extracted. Let h f ,u be the energy value for the
uth band at frame f . The corresponding log-energy value is
computed as follows:
x f ,u = log
(
1 + h f ,u
)
. (12)
The values x f ,u provide a time-frequency perceptual map of
the audio signal (see Figure 1). The log-energy values are
“rasterized” as a vector x ∈ Rn, where n = UN/F is the
total number of log-energy values extracted from the audio
stream.
(2) Random Projections. A number of linear random pro-
jections y ∈ Rm, m < n, is produced as y = Ax. The
entries of the matrix A ∈ Rm×n are sampled from a Gaussian
distribution N (0, 1/n), using some random seed S, which
will be sent as part of the hash to the user.
(3) Wyner-Ziv Encoding. The random projections y are
quantized with a uniform scalar quantizer with step size Δ.
As mentioned in Section 1, to reduce the number of bits
needed to represent the hash, we do not send directly the
quantization indices. Instead, we observe that the random
projections computed from the possibly tampered audio
signal will be available at the decoder side. Therefore, we can
perform lossy encoding with side information at the decoder,
where the source to be encoded is y and the “noisy” random
projections y˜ = Ax˜ play the role of the side information. The
vector x˜ contains the log-energy values of the audio signal
received at the decoder. With respect to the distributed source
coding setting illustrated in Section 2.2, we have X = y, Y =
y˜, N = b = y˜−y. Following the approach widely adopted in
the literature on distributed video coding [24], we perform
bitplane extraction on the quantization bin indices. Then
each bitplane vector is LDPC coded to create the hash.
4.2. Hash Decoding and Tampering Identification. The CU
receives the (possibly tampered) audio stream ˜X and requests
the syndrome bits and the random seed of the hash H(X, S)
from the authentication server. On each user’s request, a
diﬀerent seed S is used in order to avoid that a malicious
attack could exploit the knowledge of the nullspace of A [14].
(1) Frame-Based Subband Log-Energy Extraction. A percep-
tual, time-frequency representation of the signal ˜X received
by the CU is computed using the same algorithm described
above for the CP side. At this step, the vector x˜ is produced.
(2) Random Projections. A set of m linear random measure-
ments y˜ = Ax˜ are computed using a pseudorandom matrix
A whose entries are drawn from a Gaussian distribution with
the same seed S as the encoder.
(3) Wyner-Ziv Decoding. A quantized version ŷ is obtained
using the hash syndrome bits and y˜ as side information.
LDPC decoding is performed starting from the most signifi-
cant bitplane.
(i) If a feedback channel is available, decoding always
succeeds, unless an upper bound is imposed on the
maximum number of hash bits.
(ii) Conversely, if the actual distortion between the
original and the tampered signal is higher than the
maximum tolerated distortion determined by the
original CP, decoding might fail.
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(4) Distortion Estimation. If Wyner-Ziv decoding succeeds,
an estimate of the distortion in terms of a perceptual signal-
to-noise ratio is computed using the projections of the
subsampled energy spectrum of the tampering. Let ̂b = y˜− ŷ
be the projections of the subsampled energy spectrum of
the tampering; we define the perceptual signal-to-noise ratio
(SNRP) of the received audio stream as














This definition needs some further interpretation. In fact,
we compute the SNRP from the projections in place of the
whole time-frequency perceptual map of both the signal and
the tampering. This is justified by the energy conservation
principle stated in (11) and by the fact that, at the CU side, no
information about the authentic audio content is available;
hence, this is an approximation of the actual SNRP , which
uses the quantized projections obtained by decoding the hash
signature, in the reasonable hypothesis that ‖ŷ‖ ≈ ‖y‖ and
‖̂b‖ ≈ ‖b‖.
(5) Tampering Estimation. If the tampering can be repre-
sented by a sparse set of coeﬃcients in some basis Ψi, it
can be reconstructed starting from the random projections
b = y˜ − ŷ by solving the following optimization problem, as






2 ≤ . (14)
For a given orthonormal basis Ψi, the expansion of the
tampering in that basis, that is, αi = ΨTi (x − x˜), might not
be sparse enough with respect to the number of available
random projections m and the optimization algorithm might
not converge to a feasible solution. In such cases, it is not
possible to perform tampering identification, and a diﬀerent
orthonormal basis Ψ j , j /= i is tested. If the optimization
algorithm does not converge for any of the tested bases,
the tampering is declared to be nonsparse. This is the case,
for example, of quantization noise introduced by audio
compression. If the reconstruction succeeds for more than
one basis, we choose the one in which the tampering is the
sparsest. While, in principle, this just means that we should
take the basis that returns the smallest 0 metrics, we have
in practice to cope with reconstruction noise, which in fact
prevents the recovered tampering to be exactly sparse. A
simple solution is to select the basis that gives the smallest
1 norm; however, this approach has the drawback of being
too sensitive toward high values of the coeﬃcients (e.g., due
to diﬀerent dynamic ranges in the transform domains). As
experimentally shown in Section 7.2, this bias has the side-
eﬀect that selecting the minimum 1 norm reconstruction
does not ensure that one is performing the best possible
tampering estimation. A more eﬀective heuristic is to use
some p metrics, with 0 < p < 1, or similar norms, as the
ones devised in [32]. In our experiments, we have computed










where δ has been set so that arctan(1/δ) = 1.
5. Choice of the Hash Parameters
In the hash construction procedure, there are two parameters
that influence the quality of tampering estimation. The
number of random projections m used to build the hash, and
the number of bitplanes J which determines the distortion
due to quantization on the reconstructed measurements at
the user side. In this section we analyze the tradeoﬀ between
the rate needed to encode the hash, which also depends
on the maximum allowed tampering level as explained in
Section 6, and the accuracy of the tampering estimation;
a larger number of bitplanes J and of measurements m
correspond to a higher quality of tampering estimation, and
at the same time to a higher rate spent for the hash. In order
to find an optimal tradeoﬀ between m and J , we conducted
Monte carlo simulations on a generic sparse signal x, with
two diﬀerent sparsity levels k/n. We evaluate the goodness of
the tampering estimation by calculating the reconstruction
normalized MSE (NMSER) between the original k-sparse







The noise z = x̂ − x in (4) in this case corresponds to
quantization noise, which is uniformly distributed between
−Δ/2 and Δ/2, where Δ is the quantization step size. We
measure the impact of quantization noise by measuring the
signal-to-quantization noise ratio





where ŷ is the quantized version of the random projections
y = Ax. As for the reconstruction basis, Ψ, we just assign
Ψ = I in (4), that is, we assume that the signal is sparse as
is, or equivalently that some oracle has told us the optimal
sparsifying basis in advance. Figure 3 shows the NMSER
contour set for two levels of sparsity (k/n = 0.15 and k/n =
0.25) as a function of the number of projections m and of
the quantization distortion of the measurements (SNRy).
We observe a graceful improvement of the performance by
increasing either m or SNRy. For the same values of the
parameters, the normalized MSE of the reconstructed signal
is lower for sparser signals (k/n = 0.15). This is justified by
the CS result on the number of projections which requires
m ≥ C·k log2(n/k) (see Section 2.1). Thus the contour set
for k/n = 0.25 appears as it was “shifted” to the right
with respect to the case k/n = 0.15 in Figure 3. As for the
quantization of the projections, provided that the number
of measurements is compatible with the sparsity level as
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explained before, we can observe that the value of NMSER
decreases as SNRy becomes larger. In a practical scenario, the
quantization step size Δ should be chosen in such a way to
attain SNRy ≥ 25 dB, in order to be robust with the choice
of m, which depends on the actual sparsity of the tampering
and on the constant C and is therefore unknown at the CP
side. In our experiments in the rest of the paper, we have set
C = 1.3.
6. Rate Allocation
In Section 3 we have shown that the correlation model
between the original and the tampered random projections
can be written as
y˜ = y + b. (18)
Hereafter, we assume that y and b are statistically inde-
pendent. This is reasonable if the tampering is considered
independent from the original audio content.
Let j = 1, . . . , J denote the bitplane index and Rj the
bitrate (in bits/symbol) needed to decode the jth bitplane.
As mentioned in Section 3, the probability density function
of y and b can be well approximated to be zero mean
Gaussian, respectively, with variance σ2y and σ
2
b . The rate
estimation algorithm receives in input the source variance
σ2y , the correlation noise variance σ
2
b , the quantization step
size Δ, and the number of bitplanes to be encoded J and
returns the average number of bits needed to decode each
bitplane Rj , j = 1, . . . , J . The value of σ2y can be immediately
estimated from the random projections at the time of hash
generation. The value of σ2b is set to be equal to the maximum
MSE distortion between the original and the tampered
signal, for which tampering identification can be attempted.
The rate allocated to each bitplane is given by






where y j denotes the jth bitplane of y. In fact LDPC decod-
ing of bitplane j exploits the knowledge of the real-valued
side information y˜ as well as previously decoded bitplanes
y j−1, y j−2, . . . , y1. Since we use nonideal channel codes with
a finite sequence length m to perform source coding a rate
overhead of approximately ΔR = 0.1 [bit/sample] is added.
The integral needed to compute the value of the conditional
entropy in (19) is factored out in detail in our previous work
[33].
7. Experimental Results
We have carried out some experiments on 32 seconds of
speech audio data, sampled at 44100 Hz and 16 bits per
sample. The test audio consists of a piece of a newspaper
article read by a speaker; the recording is clean but for
some noise added at a few time instants, including the high
frequency noise of a shaken key ring, the wide-band noise
of some crumpling paper, and some impulsive noise in the
form of coughs of the speaker. We have set the size of the
Table 1: Perceptual SNR, sparsity factor k/n in the most “sparsify-
ing” basis (in parentheses) and m/n ratio for the three considered
tampering example.
SNRP [dB] Sparsity (k/n) m/n
T 20.3 9% (1D-DCT) 0.54
F 11.5 26% (2D-DCT) 0.66
TF 14.5 6% (Haar) 0.54
audio frame to F = 11025 samples (0.25 seconds), and the
number of Mel frequency bands to U = 32, obtaining a total
of 128 audio frames corresponding to n = 4096 log-energy
coeﬃcients. We have then assembled a testbed considering 3
kinds of tampering.
Time Localized Tampering (T). We have replaced some words
in the speech at diﬀerent positions, for a total tampering
length of 3.75 seconds (about 11.7% of the total length of
the audio sequence).
Frequency Localized Tampering (F). A low-pass phone-band
filter (cut-oﬀ frequency at 3400 Hz and stop frequency at
4000 Hz) is applied to the entire original audio stream.
Time-Frequency Localized Tampering (TF). A cough at the
beginning of the stream and the noise of the key ring in the
middle are canceled out using the standard noise removal
tool of the “Audacity” free audio editing software [34]. The
noise removal tool implemented in this application is an
adaptive filter, whose frequency response depends on the
local frequency characteristics of the noise. In this case, the
total time length of the attack is 4.36 seconds.
The reconstruction of the tampering has been attempted
in 3 diﬀerent bases, besides the log-energy domain: 1D DCT
(discrete cosine transform across frequency bands of the
same frame; this corresponds to extracting Mel frequency
cepstral coeﬃcients), 2D DCT (across time and frequency),
and 2D Haar wavelet. Table 1 summarizes the perceptual
SNRs and the sparsity of the three tampering examples, in
the domain where its values is the lowest. It also reports the
number of computed projections m in terms of the ratiom/n.
Note that this ratio is always less than one (i.e., m < n), thus
the adopted setting is coherent with the compressive sensing
framework explained in Section 2.1. In the following, we
evaluate two aspects of the system, namely: (1) the rate spent
for Wyner-Ziv encoding the hash with respect to the rate that
would have been spent for encoding and transmitting the
projections without DSC; (2) the relation between the 1 and
the inverse tangent norms of the quality of the reconstructed
tampering in diﬀerent domains.
7.1. Rate-Distortion Performance of the Hash Signature. As
described in Section 4, we use distributed source coding for
reducing the payload due to the hash. In this section, we
want to quantify the bit-saving obtained with Wyner-Ziv
coding of the hash. In order to do so, we have compared the
rate distortion function of Wyner-Ziv (WZ) coding and of
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(b) k/n = 0.25
Figure 3: Normalized MSE of the reconstructed tampering as a function of the number of measurements m and the measures signal-to-
quantization noise ratio SNRy , expressed in dB.
hash direct quantization and transmission, that is, without
using DSC (NO-WZ). Figure 4 depicts these two situations
for the cases of the frequency and time domain tampering.
In both the two graphs, the value of quantization MSE has
been normalized by the energy of the measurements y, in







The bold-dotted lines represents the theoretical WZ rate-
distortion curve of the measurements stated in (7). The
bold solid and dashed lines represent instead the actual rate-
distortion behavior obtained by using a practical WZ codec,
either using the feedback channel or directly estimating
at the encoder side the rate as explained in Section 6.
For comparison, we have also plotted the rate-distortion
functions of an ideal NO-WZ uniform quantizer (Shannon’s
bound), drawn as a thin-dotted line, and the rate-distortion
curve of an entropy-constrained scalar quantization (ECSQ),
which is a well studied and eﬀective practical quantization
scheme (thin-solid line).
We can make two main comments on the curves in
the two graphs of Figure 4. The first diﬀerence between
the frequency and the time tampering is that all the rate-
distortion functions in the frequency attack are shifted
upwards to higher rates, and have a steeper descending
slope as the distortion increases. This is due to the fact that
the frequency manipulation has a higher sparsity coeﬃcient
k/n, that is, more measurements are needed for signal
reconstruction. Although in the real application no guess
about the sparsity of the tampering can be made at the CP
side, here we have fixed a diﬀerent sparsity for the two kinds
of attacks, in order to visually prove the eﬀect of the number
of measures on the hash length. Thus, even if the rate per
measurement is the same in both the cases (it only depends
on the signal energy, as expressed in (5) and (7)), the rate
in bits per second has slopes and oﬀsets proportional to
the number of measurements m. Clearly, if we did not use
compressive sensing to reduce the dimensionality of the data
(i.e., y = x in our setting), the rate required for the hash
would have been equivalent to using random projections
with m = n; therefore, the rate saving due to compressive
sensing is approximately equal to the ratio m/n. The second
interesting remark that emerges from Figure 4 is the diﬀerent
gap between the family of WZ rates (ideal, with feedback and
without feedback) and the NO-WZ curves. As (8) suggests,
the coding gain from NO-WZ to WZ strongly depends on the
energy of the tampering, that is, to SNRP (see Table 1). In the
case of time attack, we have SNRTP = 20.3 dB, while SNRFP =
11.5 dB, thus according to (8) the bit saving achieved with
WZ is smaller in the case of the frequency attack. As can
be inferred from the graphs, this gain ranges from 20% to
70%.
7.2. Choice of the Best Tampering Reconstruction. In practice,
the tampering may be sparse or compressible in more than
one basis: this may be the case, for instance, of piece-wise
polynomials signals which are generally sparse in several
wavelet expansions. When this situation occurs, multiple
tampering reconstructions are possible, and at the CU side
there is an ambiguity about what is the best tampering
estimation. As described in Section 4.2, we are ultimately
interested in finding the sparsest tampering representation.
This requires in practice to evaluate the sparsity of the
tampering in each basis expansion; we use for this purpose
the inverse-tangent norm defined in (15). To validate the
choice of this norm, we compare the optimal basis expansion
predicted from the 1 norm and the inverse tangent norm
with the actual best basis in terms of 2 reconstruction
quality.
We evaluate the goodness of the tampering estimation by
calculating the reconstruction normalized MSE between the
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(b) Frequency sparse tampering, with sparsity factor k/n = 0.25
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(d) Reconstructed tampering in 2D-DCT domain
Figure 5: Example of frequency tampering. The hash length is 200 bps.
log-energy spectrum of the original tampering and the log-






Reconstruction NMSE values obtained with a fixed bit-rate
for the hash are shown in Tables 2 (for 200 bps) and 3 (for
400 bps). The bit rate depends on the number of measure-
ments m (given in Table 1) and on the number of bitplanes
per measurement J . For a resulting rate of 200 bps, the
number of bitplanes for the three kinds of attack (T, F, TF)
is, respectively, 7, 5, and 6. When the rate is 400 bps, we have
J = 10 for the time attack, J = 8 for the frequency attack,
and J = 9 for the time-frequency tampering. From the tables
it is clear that, by looking for a sparse tampering in other
bases besides the canonical one (log-energy), better results
can be achieved using the same hash length, as highlighted
by the bold numbers in the tables. In particular, it can be
observed that the wide-band, time-localized tampering is
better reconstructed using the 1D-DCT basis, which is able
to capture tampering correlations only along the frequency
axis, avoiding tampering discontinuities over time. The
frequency-localized tampering is better reconstructed using
the 2D-DCT basis, due to its time extension and wide-band
characterization which exhibits only a single discontinuity
along the frequency axis. Finally, Haar wavelet is a good
compromise to detect time-frequency localized tampering
because it is able to deal with discontinuities along both time
and frequency axes.
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Table 2: NMSER for tampering reconstruction with a hash at a bit
rate of 200 bps.
Log-energy 1D-DCT 2D-DCT Haar wavelet
T 7.1·10−3 4.8·10−3 2.5·10−2 7.9·10−3
F 1.1·10−1 3.6·10−2 8.6·10−3 1.3·10−2
TF 2.3·10−3 1.5·10−3 4.3·10−3 1.4·10−3
Table 3: NMSER for tampering reconstruction with a hash at a bit
rate of 400 bps.
Log-energy 1D-DCT 2D-DCT Haar wavelet
T 2.4·10−4 2.1·10−4 1.6·10−2 4.5·10−4
F 9.3·10−2 1.2·10−2 1.9·10−3 3.1·10−3
TF 4.7·10−5 6.0·10−5 1.1·10−3 4.5·10−5
Table 4: 1-norm of the tampering using a fixed bit-rate for the
hash signature of 200 bps.
Log-energy 1D-DCT 2D-DCT Haar wavelet
T 265.33 183.06 366.05 248.26
F 1219.12 1005.34 251.41 488.08
TF 509.88 256.00 445.95 260.71
Table 5: 1-norm of the tampering using a fixed bit-rate for the
hash signature of 400 bps.
Log-energy 1D-DCT 2D-DCT Haar wavelet
T 344.57 246.97 543.06 338.81
F 1761.76 1394.95 445.42 731.58
TF 594.46 330.28 639.89 325.64
Tables 4 and 5 show the 1 norms of the reconstructed
tampering coeﬃcients in the four analyzed bases. Note that
at a rate equal to 200 bps, the 1 norm suggests, for the
time-frequency (TF) tampering, that the best reconstruction
is with the 1D-DCT coeﬃcients. However, Table 2 indicates
that the best reconstruction is actually in the Haar wavelet
domain. This is due to the noise introduced by compressive
sensing recovery at low rates, which makes the use of the 1
norm as an estimator of the sparsity more error-prone. This
eﬀect is partially alleviated using the inverse tangent norm,
as shown in Tables 6 and 7.
To have a visual insight of the eﬀect of diﬀerent bases
in the tampering reconstruction, we have drawn in Figure 5
the log-energy spectrum of the original audio signal and
of the frequency-localized (F) tampering, followed by the
log-energy spectrum of the tampering reconstructed in two
diﬀerent domains using a hash rate of 200 bps. It apparent
from the figure that the quality of the estimated tampering
reconstructed using 2D-DCT considerably overcomes the
one obtained in the log-energy domain.
8. Conclusions
We presented a hash-based tampering identification system
for detecting and identifying illegitimate manipulations in
Table 6: Inverse tangent norm of the tampering using a fixed bit-
rate for the hash signature of 200 bps.
Log-energy 1D-DCT 2D-DCT Haar wavelet
T 270.36 166.68 455.10 252.26
F 1115.59 793.15 187.00 323.35
TF 324.44 150.30 349.18 136.60
Table 7: Inverse tangent norm of the tampering using a fixed bit-
rate for the hash signature of 400 bps.
Log-energy 1D-DCT 2D-DCT Haar wavelet
T 324.41 224.92 675.91 334.40
F 1586.11 1087.59 412.81 575.68
TF 308.54 196.59 536.68 171.91
audio files. The algorithm works with sparse modifications,
leveraging the recent compressive sensing results for recon-
structing the tampering from a set of random nonadaptive
measurements. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the
proposed system is its ability to reconstruct a tampering
that is sparse in some orthonormal basis or frame, without
knowing at the CP side the actual content alteration. In
practice, such an approach is feasible only if the bit length
of the hash is not too large; we have found that encoding
the hash signature through a distributed source coding
paradigm enables a consistent reduction of the transmitted
bits, especially when the strength of the tampering is small
compared to the original signal energy. The hash size may
be further decreased in the future by considering weighted 1
minimization [32] to reduce the number of measurements
required by the algorithm.
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